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Highlights
Highlights on the paper - A New Construction of Multi-receiver
Authentication Codes from Pseudo-Symplectic Geometry over
Finite Fields
Xiuli Wang
(College of Science, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin, 300300, P.R.China.)
1. We realize the generalization of the results of the article [8] from symplectic geometry to
pseudo-symplectic geometry over Finite Fields.
2. Theorem 3.7
PI[i, L] =
1
q(n−l)(ν−r)+(r−n+1)
, PS [i, L] =
1
qr−l
respectively, where i < L.
3. From above we see, substitution attack from RL on a receiver gets to the maximum when
l = r − 1.
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A New Construction of Multi-receiver Authentication Codes
from Pseudo-Symplectic Geometry over Finite Fields
Xiuli Wang
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Abstract: Multi-receiver authentication codes allow one sender to construct an authenticated message for
a group of receivers such that each receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. In this paper, we
constructed one multi-receiver authentication codes from pseudo-symplectic geometry over finite fields. The
parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of this codes are also computed.
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§1 Introduction
Multi-receiver authentication codes (MRA-codes) are introduced by Desmedt, Frankel, and Yung
(DFY) [1] as an extension of Simmons’ model of unconditionally secure authentication. In an MRA-
codes, a sender wants to authenticate a message for a group of receivers such that each receiver can
verify authenticity of the received message. There are three phases in an MRA-codes:
1. Key distribution. The KDC (key distribution centre) privately transmits the key information
to the sender and each receiver (the sender can also be the KDC).
2. Broadcast. For a source state, the sender generates the authenticated message using his/her
key and broadcasts the authenticated message.
3. Veri f ication. Each user can verify the authenticity of the broadcast message.
Denote by X1 × · · · × Xn the direct product of sets X1, · · · , Xn, and by pi the projection mapping
of X1 × · · · × Xn on Xi. That is, pi : X1 × · · · × Xn → Xi defined by pi(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = xi. Let
g1 : X1 → Y1 and g2 : X2 → Y2 be two mappings, we denote the direct product of g1 and g2 by
g1 × g2, where g1 × g2 : X1 × X2 → Y1 × Y2 is defined by (g1 × g2)(x1, x2) = (g1(x1), g2(x2)). The
identity mapping on a set X is denoted by 1X .
Let C = (S , M, E, f ) and Ci = (S , Mi, Ei, fi), i = 1, 2, ..., n, be authentication codes. We call
(C; C1,C2, · · · ,Cn) a multi-receiver authentication code (MRA-code) if there exist two mappings
τ : E → E1 × · · ·×En and π : M → M1 × · · ·× Mn such that for any (s, e) ∈ S ×E and any 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
the following identity holds
pi(π f (s, e)) = fi((1S × piτ(s, e)).
Let τi = piτ and πi = piπ. Then we have for each (s, e) ∈ S × E
πi f (s, e) = fi(1S × τi)(s, e).
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We adopt Kerckhoff’s principle that everything in the system except the actual keys of the sender
and receivers is public. This includes the probability distribution of the source states and the sender’s
keys.
Attackers could be outsiders who do not have access to any key information, or insiders who
have some key information. We only need to consider the latter group as it is at least as powerful as
the former. We consider the systems that protect against the coalition of groups of up to a maximum
size of receivers, and we study impersonation and substitution attacks.
Assume there are n receivers R1, · · · , Rn. Let L = {i1, · · · , il} ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, RL = {Ri1 , · · · , Ril} and
EL = ERi1 × · · · × ERil . We consider the attack from RL on a receiver Ri, where i < L.
Impersonation attack: RL, after receiving their secret keys, send a message m to Ri. RL is
successful if m is accepted by Ri as authentic. We denote by PI[i, L] the success probability of RL in
performing an impersonation attack on Ri. This can be expressed as
PI[i, L] = max
eL∈EL
max
m∈M
P(m is accepted by Ri|eL)
where i < L.
S ubstitution attack: RL, after observing a message m that is transmitted by the sender, replace m
with another message m′. RL is successful if m′ is accepted by Ri as authentic. We denote by PS [i, L]
the success probability of RL in performing a substitution attack on Ri . We have
PS [i, L] = max
eL∈EL
max
m∈M
max
m′,m∈M
P(Ri accepts m′|m, eL)
where i < L.
§2 Pseudo-Symplectic Geometry
Let Fq be the finite field with q elements, where q is a power of 2, n = 2ν + δ and δ=1,2. Let
K =
(
0 I(ν)
I(ν) 0
)
, S 1 =
(
K
1
)
, S 2 =

K
0 1
1 1

and S δ is an (2ν + δ) × (2ν + δ) non-alternate symmetric matrix.
The pseudo-symplectic group of degree (2ν + δ) over Fq is defined to be the set of matrices
Ps2ν+δ(Fq) = {T |TS δ tT = S δ} denoted by Ps2ν+δ(Fq).
Let F(2ν+δ)q be the (2ν + δ) -dimensional row vector space over Fq. Ps2ν+δ(Fq) has an action on
F(2ν+δ)q defined as follows
F(2ν+δ)q × Ps2ν+δ(Fq) → F(2ν+δ)q
((x1, x2, . . . , x2ν+δ), T ) → (x1, x2, . . . , x2ν+δ)T.
The vector space F(2ν+δ)q together with this group action is called the pseudo-symplectic space over
the finite field Fq of characteristic 2.
Let P be an m-dimensional subspace of F(2ν+δ)q , then PS δ tP is cogredient to one of the following
three normal forms
M( m, 2s, s ) =

0 I(s)
I(s) 0
0(m−2s)

M( m, 2s + 1, s ) =

0 I(s)
I(s) 0
1
0(m−2s−1)

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M( m, 2s + 2, s ) =

0 I(s)
I(s) 0
0 1
1 1
0(m−2s−2)

for some s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ [m/2]. We say that P is a subspace of type (m, 2s + τ, s, ǫ), where τ
=0,1 or 2 and ǫ =0 or 1, if
(i) PS δ tP is cogredient to M(m, 2s + τ, s), and
(ii) e2ν+1 < P or e2ν+1 ∈ P according to ǫ = 0 or ǫ = 1, respectively.
Let P be an m-dimensional subspace of F(2ν+δ)q . Denote by P⊥ the set of vectors which are
orthogonal to every vector of P, i.e.,
P⊥ = {y ∈ F(2ν+δ)q |yS δ t x = 0 f or all x ∈ P}.
Obviously, P⊥ is a (2ν + δ − m)-dimensional subspace of F(2ν+δ)q .
More properties of pseudo-symplectic geometry over finite fields can be found in [2].
In [3], Desmedt, Frankel and Yung gave two constructions for MRA-codes based on polynomials
and finite geometries, respectively. There are other constructions of multi-receiver authentication
codes are given in [4 − 7]. The construction of authentication codes is combinational design in
its nature. We know that the geometry of classical groups over finite fields, including symplectic
geometry, pseudo-symplectic geometry, unitary geometry and orthogonal geometry can provide a
better combination of structure and easy to count. In this paper we constructed one multi-receiver
authentication codes from pseudo-symplectic geometry over finite fields. The parameters and the
probabilities of deceptions of this codes are also computed. We realize the generalization of the
results of the article [8] from symplectic geometry to pseudo-symplectic geometry over Finite Fields.
§3 Construction
Let Fq be a finite field with q elements and ei(1 ≤ i ≤ 2ν + 2) be the row vector in F(2ν+2)q
whose i−th coordinate is 1 and all other coordinates are 0. Assume that 2 < n + 1 < r < ν.
U = 〈e1, e2, · · · , en〉, i.e., U is an n−dimensional subspace of F(2ν+2)q generated by e1, e2, · · · , en, then
U⊥ = 〈e1, · · · , eν, eν+n+1, · · · , e2ν+2〉. The set of source states S={s|s is a subspace of type (2r − n +
1, 2(r−n), r−n, 1) and U ⊂ s ⊂ U⊥}; the set of transmitter’s encoding rules ET={eT |eT is a subspace
of type (2n, 2n, n, 0) and U ⊂ eT }; the set of i− th receiver’s decoding rules ERi={eRi |eRi is a subspace
of type (n+1, 0, 0, 0) which is orthogonal to 〈e1, · · · , ei−1, ei+1, · · · , en〉}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; the set of messages
M = {m|m is a subspace of type (2r + 1, 2r, r, 1) and U ⊂ m}.
1. Key Distribution. The KDC randomly chooses a subspace eT ∈ ET , then privately sends eT to
the sender T . Then KDC randomly chooses a subspace eRi ∈ ERi and eRi ⊂ eT , then privately sends
eRi to the i − th receiver, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. Broadcast. For a source state s ∈ S , the sender calculates m = s + eT and broadcast m.
3. Veri f ication. Since the receiver Ri holds the decoding rule eRi , Ri accepts m as authentic if
eRi ⊂ m. Ri can get s from s = m ∩ U⊥.
Lemma 3.1 The above construction of multi-receiver authentication codes is reasonable, that is
(1) s + eT = m ∈ M, for all s ∈ S and eT ∈ ET ;
(2) for any m ∈ M, s = m∩U⊥ is the uniquely source state contained in m and there is eT ∈ ET ,
such that m = s + eT .
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Proof. (1) For any s ∈ S , eT ∈ ET , Because s is a subspace of type (2r − n, 2(r − n), r −
n, 1) and U ⊂ s ⊂ U⊥}, we can assume that
s =

U
Q
e2ν+1

n
2(r−n)
1
and 
U
Q
e2ν+1
S 2
t 
U
Q
e2ν+1
 =

0(n) 0 0 0
0 0 I(r−n) 0
0 I(r−n) 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ,
eT =
(
U
V
)
n
n
and (
U
V
)
S 2
t ( U
V
)
S 2
t ( U
V
)
=
(
0 I(n)
I(n) 0
)
.
Obviously, for any v ∈ V and v , 0,v < s, therefore,
m = s + eT =

U
V
Q
e2ν+1
 ,
and 
U
V
Q
e2ν+1
S 2
t 
U
V
Q
e2ν+1
 =

0 I(n) 0 0 0
I(n) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I(r−n) 0
0 0 I(r−n) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

.
From above, m is a subspace of type (2r + 1, 2r, r, 1) and U ⊂ m, i.e., m ∈ M.
(2) For m ∈ M, m is a subspace of type (2r + 1, 2r, r, 1) and U ⊂ m, so there is a subspace
V ⊂ m, satisfying (
U
V
)
S 2
t ( U
V
)
=
(
0 I(n)
I(n) 0
)
.
Then we can assume that
m =

U
V
Q
e2ν+1
 .
and satisfying

U
V
Q
e2ν+1
S 2
t 
U
V
Q
e2ν+1
 =

0 I(n) 0 0 0
I(n) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I(r−n) 0
0 0 I(r−n) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

.
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Let
s =

U
Q
e2ν+1
 .
For s is a subspace of type (2r−n+1, 2(r−n), r−n, 1) and U ⊂ s ⊂ U⊥, i.e., s ∈ S is a source state.
For any v ∈ V and v , 0,v < s is obvious, i.e., V ∩ U⊥ = {0}. Therefore, m ∩ U⊥ =

U
Q
e2ν+1
 = s.
Let eT =
(
U
V
)
, then eT is a transmitter’s encoding rule and satisfying m = s + eT .
If s′ is another source state contained in m, then U ⊂ s′ ⊂ U⊥. Therefore, s′ ⊂ m ∩ U⊥ = s, while
dims′=dims, so s′=s, i.e., s is the uniquely source state contained in m.
From Lemma 3.1, we know that such construction of multi-receiver authentication codes is rea-
sonable and there are n receivers in this system. Next we compute the parameters of this codes.
Lemma 3.2 The parameters of this construction are
|S | = N(2(r − n), 2(r − n), r − n, 0; 2ν + 2); |ET | = qn(ν−n+1); |ERi | = qν−n+1.
Proof. Since U ⊂ s ⊂ U⊥, s has the form as follows
s =

I(n) 0 0 0 0 0
0 B2 0 B4 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
 ,
where B2, B4 is a subspace of type (2(r−n), 2(r−n), r−n, 0) in the pseudo-symplectic space Fq(2ν+2).
So |S | = N(2(r − n), 2(r − n), r − n, 0; 2ν+ 2).
Since eT is a subspace of type (2n, 2n, n, 0), eT has the form as follows
eT =
(
I(n) 0 0 0 0 0
0 R2 I(n) R4 R5 R6
)
n ν−n n ν−n 1 1
.
For eT is a subspace of type (2n, 2n, n, 0), so R4 = 0 and R6 = 0, R2, R5 arbitrarily. Therefore
|ET | = qn(ν−n+1).
For any eRi ∈ ERi , eRi is a subspace of type (n+1, 0, 0, 0) which is orthogonal to 〈e1, · · · , ei−1, ei+1, · · · , en〉,
1 ≤ i ≤ n. So we can assume that
eRi =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 H′3 0 0 1 0 H
′
8 H
′
9 H
′
10

l n−l ν−n l i−l−1 1 n−i ν−n 1 1
.
Since eRi is a subspace of type (n + 1, 0, 0, 0), so H′8 = 0 and H′10 = 0, H′3, H′9 arbitrarily. Therefore,
|ERi | = qν−n+1.
Lemma 3.3 (1) The number of eT contained in m is qn(r−n+1);
(2) The number of the messages is |M| = q2n(ν−r+1)N(2(r − n), 2(r − n), r − n, 1; 2ν + 2).
Proof. Let m be a message, from the definition of m, we may take m as follows
m =

I(n) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(r−n) 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I(n) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 I(r−n) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

n r−n ν−r n r−n ν−r 1 1
.
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if eT ⊂ m, then we can assume that
eT =
(
I(n) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 R2 0 I(n) 0 0 R7 0
)
n r−n ν−r n r−n ν−r 1 1
,
where R2 and R7 is arbitrarily. Therefore the number of eT which contained m is qn(r−n+1);
(2) We know that a message contains only one source state and the number of the transmitter’s
encoding rules contained in a message is qn(r−n+1). Therefore we have |M| = |S ||ET |/qn(r−n+1) =
qn(ν−r)N(2(r − n), 2(r − n), r − n, 0; 2ν+ 2)
Assume there are n receivers R1, · · · , Rn. Let L = {i1, · · · , il} ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, RL = {Ri1 , · · · , Ril} and
EL = ERi1 × · · · × ERil . We consider the impersonation attack and substitution attack from RL on a
receiver Ri, where i < L.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that RL = {R1, · · · , Rl}, EL = ER1 × · · · × ERl , where
1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1. First, we will proof the following results:
Lemma 3.4 For any eL = (eR1 , · · · , eRl) ∈ EL, the number of eT containing eL is q(ν−n+1)(n−l).
Proof. For any eL = (eR1 , · · · , eRl) ∈ EL, we can assume that
eL =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 R3 I(l) 0 0 R7 0

l n−l ν−n l n−l ν−n 1 1
.
Therefore, eT containing eL has the form as follows
eT =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 R3 I(l) 0 0 R7 0
0 0 H3 0 I(n−l) 0 H7 0

l n−l ν−n l n−l ν−n 1 1
,
where H3, H7 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of eT containing eL is q(ν−n+1)(n−l).
Lemma 3.5 For any m ∈ M and eL, eRi ⊂ m,
(1) the number of eT contained in m and containing eL is q(r−n+1)(n−l).;
(2) the number of eT contained in m and containing eL, eRi is q(n−l−1)(r−n+1).
Proof. (1) From the definition of m, we may take m as follows
m =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 I(r−n) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 I(l) 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 I(r−n) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

l n−l r−n ν−r l n−l r−n ν−r 1 1
.
If eL ⊂ m, then eL has the form as follows:
eL =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 R3 0 I(l) 0 0 0 R9 0

l n−l r−n ν−r l n−l r−n ν−r 1 1
.
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If eT ⊂ m and eT ⊃ eL, then
eT =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 R3 0 I(l) 0 0 0 R9 0
0 0 H3 0 0 I(n−l) 0 0 H9 0

l n−l r−n ν−r l n−l r−n ν−r 1 1
,
where H3 and H9 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of eT which contained in m and containing eL is
q(r−n+1)(n−l).
(2) Similarly, by computation, we can proof that the number of eT contained in m and containing
eL, eRi has the following the form
eT =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 R3 0 I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 R9 0
0 0 H′′3 0 0 I
(i−l−l) 0 0 0 0 H′′9 0
0 0 H′3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 H′9 0
0 0 H′′′3 0 0 0 0 I
(n−i) 0 0 H′′′9 0

l n−l r−n ν−r l i−l−1 1 n−i r−n ν−r 1 1
,
where R′′3 , R
′′
9 and R′′′3 , R′′′9 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of eT contained in m and containing
eL, eRi is q(n−l−1)(r−n+1).
Lemma 3.6 Assume that m1 and m2 are two distinct messages which commonly contain a trans-
mitter’s encoding rule eT . s1 and s2 contained in m1 and m2 are two source states, respectively.
Assume that s0 = s1 ∩ s2, dim s0 = k, then n ≤ k ≤ 2r − n. For any eL, eRi ⊂ m1 ∩m2, the number of
eT contained in m1 ∩ m2 and containing eL, eRi is qk(n−l−1).
Proof. Since m1 = s1 + eT , m2 = s2 + eT and m1 , m2, then s1 , s2. For any s ∈ S ,
U ∈ s,Obviously, n ≤ k ≤ 2r − n. Assume that s′i is the complementary subspace of s0 in the si, then
si = s0 + s
′
i (i = 1, 2). From mi = si + eT = s0 + s′i + eT , we have m1 ∩ m2 = s0 + eT .
From the definition of the message, we may take mi, i = 1, 2 as follows
mi =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Pi3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 I(l) 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 I(r−n) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

l
n−l
r−n
l
n−l
r−n
1
l n−l r−n ν−r l n−l r−n ν−r 1 1
.
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Let
m1 ∩ m2 =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 P3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 I(l) 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 I(r−n) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

l
n−l
r−n
l
n−l
r−n
1
l n−l r−n ν−r l n−l r−n ν−r 1 1
.
From above we know that m1 ∩ m2 = s0 + eT , then dim(m1 ∩ m2) = k + 2n − n = k + n, therefore,
dim
(
P3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
)
= k + n − (2n + r − n) = k − r.
For any eL, eRi ⊂ m1 ∩ m2, we can assume that
eL =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 R3 0 I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 R11 0

l
n−l
l
l n−l r−n ν−r l i−l−1 1 n−i r−n ν−r 1 1
,
eRi =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 H′3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 H
′
11 0

l
n−l
1
l n−l r−n ν−r l i−l−1 1 n−i r−n ν−r 1 1
,
If eT ⊂ m1 ∩ m2 and containing eL, eRi , so eT has the form as follows
eT =

I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 I(n−l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 R3 0 I(l) 0 0 0 0 0 R11 0
0 0 H′′3 0 0 I
(i−l−l) 0 0 0 0 H′′11 0
0 0 H′3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 H′11 0
0 0 H′′′3 0 0 0 0 I(n−i) 0 0 H′′′11 0

l
n−l
l
i−l−l
1
n−i
l n−l r−n ν−r l i−l−1 1 n−i r−n ν−r 1 1
.
where every row of (
R′′3 0 0 R′′11 0
R′′′3 0 0 R′′′11 0
)
is the linear combination of the base of
(
P3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
)
.
So it is easy to know that the number of eT ⊂ m1 ∩ m2 and containing eL, eRi is q(k−r)(n−l−1).
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Theorem 3.7 In the constructed multi-receiver authentication codes, the largest probabilities of
success for impersonation attack and substitution attack from RL on a receiver Ri are
PI[i, L] =
1
q(n−l)(ν−r)+(r−n+1)
, PS [i, L] =
1
qr−l
respectively, where i < L.
Proof. Impersonation attack: RL, after receiving their secret keys, send a message m to Ri. RL
is successful if m is accepted by Ri as authentic. Therefore
PI[i, L] = max
eL∈EL

max
m∈M
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊂ m and eT ⊃ eL, eRi} |
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊃ eL} |

=
q(n−l−1)(r−n+1)
q(ν−n+1)(n−l)
=
1
q(n−l)(ν−r)+(r−n+1)
.
S ubstitution attack: RL, after observing a message m that is transmitted by the sender, replace m
with another message m′. RL is successful if m′ is accepted by Ri as authentic. Therefore
PS [i, L] = max
eL∈EL
max
m∈M

max
m′∈M
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊂ m, m′ and eT ⊃ eL, eRi} |
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊂ m and eT ⊃ eL} |

= max
n≤k≤2r−n
q(k−r)(n−l−1)
q(n−l)(r−n+1)
=
1
qr−l
.
From above we see, substitution attack from RL on a receiver gets to the maximum when l = r−1.
References
[1] Safavi-Naini R, Wang H. Multi-receiver Authentication Codes:Models, Bounds, Constructions
and Extensions, Information and Computation, 151(1):148-172, 1999
[2] WAN Zhexian. Geometry of Classical Groups over Finite Fields (2nd Edition), Science Press,
Beijing/New York, 2002
[3] Y. Desmedt, Y. Frankel and M. Yung, Multer-receiver/Multi-sender network security: efficient
authenticated multicast/feedback, IEEE Infocom’92 : 2045-2054, 1992
[4] G.J.Simmons. Message authentication with arbitration of transmitter/receiver disputes, Proc.
Eurcrypt 87. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 304:151-165, 1985
[5] Safavi-Naini R, Wang Huaxiong. New results on multi-receiver authentication/codes, Lecture
Notes in computer science, 1403:527-541, 1998
[6] Satoshi Obana and Kaoru Kurosawa. Bounds and combinatorial structure of (k,n) multi-receiver
A-Codes, Designs,codes and cryptography, 22:47-63, 2001
[7] Li Xiyang, Qin Cong. New Constructions of Multi-receiver Authentication Codes, Calculator
Engineering, 34(15):138-175, 2008
[8] Chen Shangdi, Zhao Dawei. Two Constructions of Multireceiver Authentication Codes from
Symplectic Geometry over Finite Fields.Ars Combinatoria, XCIX, April:193-203, 2011
